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China’s role in the East African oil and gas sector:  
a new model of engagement?  
While prospectors have been aware of potential oil and gas 
reserves in East Africa for over a century, geological 
complexity and political instability have conspired to hamper 
exploration. A recent game-changer has been a stratospheric 
rise in global oil prices. Up until the early 2000s, exploration 
in “frontier” regions such as East Africa proved economically 
unviable. However, with the spectacular rise in oil prices over 
the second half of the 2000s, exploration and development 
offer the potential for handsome returns.  
The Chinese Presence  
China is one actor amongst many within East Africa and has 
by no means secured the lion’s share of these new energy 
finds. Within countries containing natural gas, the Chinese 
presence is either limited to downstream activities or is 
absent. In Tanzania, the state-owned giant CNPC (Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation) is involved in the 
construction of a 500km 1.2 billion dollar pipeline which will 
transport Tanzania’s gas from Mtwara to Dar-es-Salam. 
Chinese enterprises, however, are not involved in upstream 
extraction; such activities are dominated by multi-nationals 
such as Statoil (Norway) and ExxonMobil (US) (see table 1). 
In the case of Mozambique, where significant gas deposits 
have been discovered, Chinese enterprises are largely absent 
(although they are heavily involved in the extraction of other 
energy sources, such as cooking coal).  
China’s lack of involvement in upstream gas extraction 
reflects the country’s persistently low reliance on natural gas 
as an energy supply. Crude oil is the largest segment of the 
oil & gas market in China, accounting for 95 per cent of the 
market's total value. While the IEA (International Energy 
Agency) sees China’s gas demand increasing by 6 per cent 
annually through 2035, such requirements are at present 
being met through supplies from neighbouring Central Asian 
countries (a natural gas pipeline already links Turkmenistan 
with China’s Xinjiang region) as well as large reserves of 
untapped shale gas, with unknown potential for exploitation. 
Chinese companies are significantly involved in pipelines 
projects in the region. In addition to the Tanzanian pipeline 
mentioned above, Uganda will be the beneficiary of two 
shorter pipelines which will link Lake Albert to a nearby 
refinery. Another potential pipeline will link oil finds in the 
Ogaden Basin (Ethiopia) to Berbera, a port in the 
autonomous region of Somaliland; Hong Kong-based 
PetroTrans President, John Chine, has expressed interest in 
this project, although construction has not yet begun. A 
major pipeline has been set to connect recently independent 
South Sudan’s oil fields to the port of Lamu in Kenya, 
thereby offering South Sudan a way to transport its oil to 
market without having to go through its adversary, Sudan. 
However, recent visits between Chinese delegates and South 
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Sudan President Salva Kiir, seem to suggest that China 
remains non-committal toward the costly project.  
Chinese-Western Joint Ventures 
 
China’s upstream presence in East Africa’s oil producing 
countries is more significant. Until recently, the state owned  
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was involved in 
exploration drilling in northern Kenya; while attempts were 
unsuccessful and the company pulled out, they later 
attempted to enter into a further exploration partnership   
 
Table 1:  East African Oil and Gas Reserves 
with UK’s Tullow Oil (which Tullow rejected). Within the 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the government has awarded 
exploration rights to eight blocks as well as natural gas fields 
to the privately owned Hong Kong firm, PetroTrans. In 
Uganda, CNOOC has been more successful, holding a one 
third stake, along with Tullow and France’s Total, in the 
development of oil blocks within the Lake Albert region, 
where reserves are estimated to be at around 2.4 billion 
barrels. The lake, which constitutes an international 
borderline with the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo), 
contains significant reserves on the Congolese side, although 
these have yet to be as fully developed as those on the 
Ugandan side.  
The Ugandan finds in particular point toward potential new 
forms of Chinese commercial engagement on the continent. 
The deal has seen the Ugandan government obliging the 
development of a refinery, to be built at Hoima, east of Lake 
Albert, which will cost an estimated 1.5 billion dollars and 
will be jointly funded by CNOOC, Tullow and Total. While it is 
common for a given company to purchase drilling block 
permission from a given government and then to sell these 
rights off to other companies, joint ventures involving 
Chinese and western companies in the development of 
downstream infrastructure is a more recent phenomenon. A 
pre-cursor in this regard is the construction of Sudan’s 
1600km Greater Nile Oil Pipeline, which involved Indian, 
Malaysian and Chinese companies (the latter of whom, China 
National Petroleum Corporation, own 40 per cent stake in 
the operation as well as managing the operating of the 
pipeline). 
A Potential Future Model?  
In recent years, a chorus of voices have portrayed China as 
ruthlessly exploiting Africa’s energy and minerals, often at 
the expense of western corporate involvement. However, 
within the East African context, it is evident that the Chinese 
presence is fragmented and that investment decisions are 
based on financial logic, as opposed to a top-down, state-
level project of geo-strategic encroachment. This can be 
seen, for instance, in the freezing of plans to build the South 
Sudan-Kenya pipeline: the decision was based on economic 
forecasts predicting that oil supplies will not last long enough 
to warrant the cost of the pipe’s construction.  
Another obvious factor in China’s scattered presence is the 
sheer number of companies with which the Chinese have to 
compete; a Jeffries Group report states that over 50 energy 
firms are currently involved in East Africa: Norway’s Statoil, 
British Gas and Cove Energy (UK); America’s ExxonMobil; 
France’s Total; Italy’s ENI, India’s GAIL and ONGC and 
Thailand’s PTTEP are just some of the player involved in the 
region.  
The varied nature of such investment is giving rise to new 
forms of co-operation, such as the construction of the 
Ugandan refinery. While China is already significantly 
involved in the construction of refineries on the continent 
(see table 2) they are usually constructed in conjunction with 
the given African country’s state-owned oil company. This is 
what sets the Ugandan refinery apart: it involves a 
conglomerate of foreign firms rather than an exclusively 
Chinese-African state owned enterprise venture. In 
forecasting China’s future engagement in Africa’s oil and gas 
extraction industry, it is prudent to keep the multi-national 
joint-venture model in mind. This particular collaboration 
arose as the Ugandan government insisted on the 
construction of the refinery, which will satisfy the country’s 
(as well as some of its neighbours’) oil demands. The cost of 
such a project obliged all partners to cooperate, as they 
exceeded Tullow’s capacities. If more African countries 
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Figure 1: Map of Proposed Pipeline Construction by Chinese Companies in East Africa 
containing oil oblige the construction of domestic refineries, it 
is possible that such partnerships may be more common in 
the future. More specifically, the challenge of overcoming 
specific problems in under-developed infrastructure and 
geological complexity make East Africa a potential site for 
further joint co-operation projects.  
Security Implications  
Due to political instability in various parts of Africa, the 
security risks involved in oil and gas extraction are high. The 
Chinese have experienced this first hand, with attacks on 
personnel in the DRC and Nigeria, where the rebel group 
MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), 
who have targeted foreign oil investors, warned that the 
Chinese presence “places its citizens in our line of fire”. 
Ethiopia and Sudan have also witnessed the abduction and 
murder of Chinese workers. Within East Africa, many 
significant oil fields lie in troubled border areas and disputed 
territories, including the Abeyi sector of Sudan, northern 
Kenya, the Lake Albert region in Uganda and the Ogaden and 
Sool regions between the Somali secession territories of 
Somaliland and Puntland. Such potential for conflict has a 
direct bearing on the protection of assets and personnel 
invested within a given region. Within both Sudans for 
instance, the part-Chinese owned Greater Nile Oil Pipeline 
has been subject to alleged attacks by the Sudanese 
government upon portions of the pipeline in South Sudan. 
The South Sudanese Information Minister, Barnaba Marial 
Bejamin recently stated that such attacks are “the same as 
bombing the resources of China”. 
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If the trend of joint ventures between Chinese state owned 
enterprises and other multi-nationals continues, it is likely 
there will be a rise in jointly owned assets on the continent. 
Such assets, particularly in volatile regions such as East 
Africa, will require protection. This arrangement complicates 
the process of one state securing assets located in another 
state. Rather, in this scenario, companies stemming from 
several states will, ideally, be obliged to secure their assets 
jointly. Such a phenomenon will have implications for China’s 
“go out” strategy insofar as official policy concepts of “win-
win” and “non-interference” are predicated on bilateral state 
relations between two sovereign nations. A hypothetical 
event in which Chinese and Western companies are obliged 
to jointly defend assets against a domestic African incursion 
challenges the common perception that China and the West 
are pitted against each other in Africa. On the contrary, such 
an arrangement might feed into certain localized attitudes 
which view the Chinese, along with the Euro-American 
presence, as part of a larger neo-colonial project of economic 
exploitation.  
Conclusion 
Hydrocarbon ventures in East Africa are by no means 
exhausted: with only 480 wells drilled thus far (as opposed to 
14 500 in West Africa) and new prospective reserves in 
countries such as Somalia and Madagascar, an array of new 
challenges and opportunities await those companies willing 
to invest. The role of the Chinese in the region is varied, with 
a significant presence in the oil (as opposed to the gas) 
sector and downstream infrastructure. In terms of China’s 
longer term energy security strategy, the East Africa instance 
highlights the possibility of future joint-multi-national 
ventures. Such partnerships mark a shift in China’s 
engagement on the continent thus far and have implications 
for the future security of the region.  
Because oil and gas exploration in Africa has contributed to 
inequalities, fueled ethnic conflict and exacerbated 
corruption, there is a significant chance that similar issues 
will arise within the East African context.  
Recommendations  
A common criticism leveled at Chinese investment practices 
in Africa is that they are lacking in the field of international 
business standards. China is frequently accused of lack of 
transparency, propping up repressive regimes and not 
showing sufficient commitment to environmental concerns. 
With the rise of joint ventures, Chinese firms will have more 
exposure to best business practices as western firms often 
face greater pressure to conform to such measures. Chinese 
firms should embrace this opportunity as it will facilitate 
greater integration between Chinese and Western business 
practices in Africa. Likewise, Western firms, which have 
shown a mixture of puzzlement, admiration and fear of 
Chinese success on the continent, will gain better insights 
into Chinese business practices, including, speed of 
construction and cost efficiency.  
The rise of such ventures will also increasingly put a question 
mark upon the viability of Beijing’s claim that Chinese 
engagement is unique and different in nature from Western 
engagement. If such trends continue, China will need to shift 
its policy so as to reflect such increasingly complex 
transnational ventures. Using its embassies and consulates 
abroad, the Chinese government should be very clear as to 
what investments, or portions of investments, it owns. This 
may help dispel misplaced local perceptions of a “monolithic” 
Chinese presence which may be the target of local 
discontent. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Chinese refinery involvement in Africa  
